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JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER v. NEW YORK: By Paul Kens. Lawrence: University Press of

Kansas. 1990. Pp. vii, 232. $29.95.
The tum-of-the-century baking industry was both cruel to its
workers and a public health hazard. Bakers worked twelve-hour days,
seven days a week, in cramped, dusty tenement cellars (pp. 9-12).
They enjoyed little leisure time, often living in their kitchens and
sleeping on workbenches. Bakers died young; tuberculosis was a common affiiction (pp. 9-11). Thus, New York's law 1 limiting bakers'
working hours to ten hours a day and six days a week seems reasonable by today's standards. The United States Supreme Court did not
find it so in 1905, however, striking down the law in the celebrated
case of Lochner v. New York 2
Lochner is frequently cited as the most prominent symbol of the
era of substantive due process that lasted from 1905 to 1937.3 The
case poses two great constitutional problems. The first, which has
hovered over the Court since Marbury v. Madison 4 and Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 5 is the proper role of the judiciary in the review of legislation. 6 The second problem concerns the validity and scope of substantive due process doctrine. Lochner casts a long shadow over modem
cases in which the Court has revived the doctrine, such as Roe v.
Wade. 7
1. 1895 N.Y. Laws 518.
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See, e.g.• R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 44-46 (1990); B. SIEGAN, EcONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSl1TUTION 23 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSl1TUTIONAL LAW

567 (2d ed. 1988). Commentators agree that the Lochner era came to a close when the Supreme
Court upheld minumim wage legislation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra, at 581. The Court explicitly repudiated Lochner in Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949) ("[T]he due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put
in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they
regard as offensive to the public welfare.").
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (striking down the Missouri Compromise).
6. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987) ("The spectre of
Lochner has loomed over most important constitutional decisions, whether they uphold or invalidate governmental practices.").
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For articles dealing with the problem of condemning Lochner's economic substantive due process while endorsing Roe's personal liberty substantive due process, see
Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L.
REv. 293 (1986); Schopp, Education and Contraception Make Strange Bedfellows: Brown, Griswold, Lochner and the Putative Dilemma of Liberalism, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 335 (1990); Sunstein,
supra note 6.
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Paul Kens 8 has written Lochner's biography. The first half of Judicial Power and Reform Politics recounts. the history of the Bakeshop
Act. This part of the book helps the reader understand Lochner by
describing the social conditions justifying the law, and by explaining
the philosophical and political debate surrounding economic liberties.
The second half of the book attempts to trace substantive due process
from the dissents in The Slaughter-House Cases 9 to its seeming revival
in Griswold v. Connecticut10 and Roe v. Wade. 11 These chapters fail to
offer an analysis that furthers the reader's understanding of Lochner.
Kens' account of Lochner's history in the first half of the book
lacks detail, yet it adequately enhances the reader's understanding of
the reasons for the Bakeshop Act's passage, and of why the Supreme
Court later struck it down. Particularly interesting are Chapters Four
and Five. Chapter Four describes New York state politics in the late
nineteenth century, focusing on the political machine of Republican
Party boss Thomas Collier Platt. Kens convincingly claims that the
Bakeshop Act might not have been enacted had Platt opposed the
measure (p. 26), although Platt's precise role in the Act's passage is
never explained.
In Chapter Five, which discusses the passage of the Act, Kens introduces Henry Weismann, perhaps the book's most fascinating character. Weismann, though not a baker himself, was the ambitious
leader of the bakers' union. He later betrayed his cause and represented Joseph Lochner, the bakery owner who challenged the Act's
constitutionality. Skilled at writing, speaking, and public relations,
Weismann, who published the union's newspaper, was one of the chief
agitators for reform in the 1890s. Above all an opportunist, Weismann never was able to explain adequately his act of treason (p. 99).
The book's lack of historical detail is at times troubling. Kens
sometimes fails to present a clear connection between the Bakeshop
Act and the interesting history he relates. For example, he provides
scant detail as to how the reform movement influenced the legislature
to pass the Act, or exactly how it originated; he writes only that the
New York legislature's unanimous passage of the Act shows that the
Republican leadership approved the bill (p. 57). Having read about
Boss Platt in some detail, the reader is curious about the role he or his
machine played in the legislation. Kens merely speculates that members of both houses supported the law because they were "beholden to
Boss Platt" (p. 57).
In fairness to the author, more detail than this may not be discov8. Paul Kens, J.D., Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Southwest Texas
State University.
9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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erable by research. And Kens does achieve his goal of helping the
reader understand the social and political climate which produced the
Bakeshop Act. The reader gains an understanding of the conditions
justifying the law, the interests it protected and those it threatened, as
well as a general notion of the political process from which the Act
resulted. 12 Kens' history thus sheds light on the Lochner decision,
showing, for example, that the Bakeshop Act was justified by contemporary conditions.
Just as later eras may need help in understanding the current abortion controversy, the modern student will appreciate Kens' discussion
of Herbert Spencer, whose Social Statics the fourteenth amendment
does not enact. 13 Kens is probably right that Lochner cannot be understood without realizing how pervasively late nineteenth-century
thought applied Darwinism to social, political, and economic institutions. As Professor Frank Strong explains, "[t]he Justices of the
[Lochner Court], steeped in the economics of Adam Smith and the
sociology of Herbert Spencer, unabashedly read their philosophy into
the Constitution." 14 This is evidenced by the Justices' solicitude toward laissez-faire economic theory, which posits that the state should
let economic markets function free from state regulation, allowing
stronger entities to flourish while the weaker languish.
Kens paints Herbert Spencer as the foremost advocate of the negative state. Puzzled law students reading Justice Holmes' dissent will
be interested to learn that Spencer was as well known in his time as he
is obscure in ours. Spencer espoused the popular view that the proper
role of the state is to interfere as little as possible in the lives of its
citizens. 15 Lochner rested on a view that brooked little interference in
private business. Thus, Kens' account of Spencer and his contemporaries places Lochner in proper context.
The theories of Spencer and his ilk directly contributed to the development of substantive due process, discussed in the second half of
Judicial Power and Reform Politics. By Kens' account, the doctrine
sprang into being from the pen of Judge Thomas Cooley in his Consti12. In addition, Kens does offer one interesting detail about the political process which produced the act. The act as first passed said that no "person" could work in a bakeshop over the
hours limitations; the provision was changed to read "employee." Kens explains how this
change allayed fears of unconstitutionality: "Now the limitation on hours would not apply to
individuals working in their own bakeries." P. 58.
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.''). Regarding laissez-faire,
Holmes wrote, "[t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain.'' 198 U.S. at 75.
14. F. STRONG, SUBSrANTlVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 95 (1986).
15. Pp. 67-68. See, e.g., H. SPENCER, Over-Legislation, in THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 81
(T. Beale ed. 1916).
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tutional Limitations. 16 This oversimplifies the birth of the doctrine.
Kens fails to mention the sporadic application of the doctrine in preCivil War cases, 17 and he barely acknowledges any of the long history
of due process from the Magna Carta18 to the fourteenth
amendment. 19
Given the prevalence of "negative state" social and economic theories, one would expect the Supreme Court to have struck down much
state regulation both before and after Lochner was decided. In early
fourteenth amendment cases, notably The Slaughter-House Cases, 20
the Court deferred to state legislatures. By the time Lochner was decided, however, the Court had come around to the view espoused by,
among others, Justice Stephen Field. Field thought that the due process clause required the Court to undertake a substantive review of
state legislation (pp. 92-93). State legislatures would be accorded little
leeway in making policy judgments.
Kens' analysis of the growth of substantive due process seems
skewed insofar as he suggests that Joseph Lochner could not have had
much hope for his ultimately successful appeal to the Supreme Court
(pp. 107, 115). The Court undeniably allowed some state regulation of
private property; liberty of contract was never absolute, and the Court
often found a way to uphold state legislation. 21 This is not the whole
story, however. Prior to Lochner, two Supreme Court cases upheld
eight-hour day legislation: Holden v. Hardy 22 and Atkin v. Kansas. 23
As Kens himself notes, Holden made no general statement about
shorter-hours laws and "the Atkin case still did not represent an expansion of [Holden]" (p. 109). Furthermore, Kens focuses on the important case of Munn v. Illinois, 24 in which, despite upholding an
16. T. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REsr UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
17. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 3, at 40-45 (discussing federal and state substantive due process cases prior to the Civil War). See generally Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War (pts. 1 & 2), 24 HARV. L. REv. 366, 460 (1911).
18. He merely notes that the Magna Carta is the first legal document in history to contain
anything resembling a due process clause. P. 87.
19. Professor Frank Strong argues that substantive due process has roots going back well
before the fourteenth amendment, claiming it is wrong to say "that Due Process had only procedural meaning prior to the Civil War." F. STRONG, supra note 14, at 29. Professor Siegan says it
is a "difficult question" whether, by the time the Bill of Rights was framed in 1789, due process
clauses contained a substantive component. B. SIEGAN, supra note 3, at 24. Still, Kens is right
that the doctrine grew explosively after the Civil War; he points out that Cooley's chapter on
protection of property doubled in length in later editions, "most of the growth being footnotes to
court cases that had applied his theory." P. 89.
20. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
21. Professor Tribe cites research stating that between 1899 and 1937 the Supreme Court
struck down state or federal regulations 197 times under the due process clause, "while an even
larger number of regulations survived scrutiny." L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 567 n.2.
22. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
23. 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
24. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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Illinois law regulating grain storage rates, the Court made no statement suggesting it would not use the due process clause to protect
property from state regulation (p. 94).
Most troublesome is that Kens all but ignores "the pivotal case" 25
of Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 26 described by Professor Laurence Tribe as
having a "landmark holding" which opened "[t]he floodgates of substantive due process review." 27 In Allgeyer, the Court held that the
state of Lousiana violated "liberty of contract" by regulating insurance contracts made between its citizens and out-of-state companies. 28
Kens discusses Allgeyer only in a short paragraph, noting it was a case
in which the Court used liberty of contract to invalidate a state law; he
dismisses the case from further discussion on the grounds that its facts
were easily distinguishable from Lochner's (pp. 106-07).
Yet it cannot have been accidental that Allgeyer was the first case
cited by Justice Peckham in his Lochner opinion. 29 Allgeyer did indeed represent a significant broadening of substantive due process doctrine; before that case the doctrine as espoused, for example, by Justice
Field "stood for opposition to monopoly." 30 Professor Strong argues
that "[i]n severing this right [to freely contract] from its tie with antimonopoly the Court . . . catapulted into an uncharted domain in
which substantive due process could become the obstacle to endless
instances of legal, economic and social reform." 31 As Kens claims,
Lochner did come to represent just such an obstacle (p. 2). Kens' failure to pay more attention to Allgeyer is thus strange, and certainly
represents a substantial omission from his account.
In his summary of the Lochner era, which is really no more than a
brief roadmap of substantive due process cases from 1905 to 1937,
Kens explains that Lochner did not create an absolute prohibition
25. F. STRONG, supra note 14, at 90.
26. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
27. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 567. By Tribe's account, the Lochner era arguably began with
Allgeyer,· Professor Siegan says that the era of substantive due process bearing Lochner's name
"formally commenced" with that case. B. SIEGAN, supra note 3, at 54. Others have written that
in Allgeyer "the Court took the final step toward Lochner." G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, c. SUN·
STEIN & M. TuSHNET, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 728 (1986).
28. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 592-93. Justice Peckham, who authored the Lochner opinion, wrote
for a unanimous Court in Allgeyer. One reason why Allgeyer does not carry the impact of Lochner may lie in the fact that its lengthy substantive due process language is dictum. At issue in
Allgeyer was not the substance of the Louisiana legislation, but its jurisidictional reach. Still,
Allgeyer was the direct precursor of Lochner: its "gratuitous dictum ••• solidified into [Lochner's] holding." F. STRONG, supra note 14, at 95.
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (stating that "[t]he general right to make a
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution" and citing Allgeyer).
30. F. STRONG, supra note 14, at 91. For example, Field's position in The Slaughter-House
Cases was based on the ground that the fourteenth amendment prevented states from protecting
monopolies. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 101-02 (1873) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
31. F. STRONG, supra note 14, at 91.
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against state exercise of the police power. He discusses several cases in
which the Supreme Court deferred to legislative regulation in the economic sphere. Still, economic substantive due process doctrine remained in force; Kens relates in detail the example of workmen's
compensation laws. Ironically, while these laws were generally upheld, the cases in this area took an even more narrow view of the scope
of police power than did Lochner. Even near the end of the Lochner
era, states still felt they were limited to certain dangerous trades when
enacting compensation laws (pp. 150-51). The Court staunchly defended the liberty of contract, unless matters of health and safety were
unmistakably implicated. 32
Kens offers a brief epilogue about substantive due process following the demise of Lochner. The Lochner era ended with West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 33 a case in which the Court upheld minimium wage
legislation. Even so, shortly after the decision in West Coast Hotel, the
Court hinted in United States v. Carolene Products 34 that it had not
absolutely repudiated judicial activism (p. 159). Further, Kens mentions cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 35 and Roe v. Wade 36 to
show that Lochner remains relevant to constitutional jurisprudence.37
Kens speculates as to why Lochner is view~ as an important case.
Although the case is now celebrated, the initial public reaction to
Lochner was muted (p. 128). The labor movement denounced the decision, as did some legal scholars, who castigated the Court for ignoring the wealth of sociological data justifying the bakeshop law. It was
only later that legal scholars (such as Roscoe Pound, who Kens discusses at some length) saw the significance of Lochner: "[T]he
Supreme Court did more than reject an economic and social policy. It
tabled consideration of the lines of moral reasoning advanced by reformers" (p. 136). Kens raises a complafu.t against Lochner that is
frequently made about judicial activism: "it . . . insulated certain issues from the impact of raw political power" (p. 136).
In sum, the first part of Judicial Power and Reform Politics is a
useful aid to the study of an important case and its ,Place in constitutional law; it provides a relevant political, social, and theoretical history to the decision ~n Lochner. The second part of the book is less
32. P. 153. Fqr example, in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), the Court, having
received the first ever Brandeis Brief (described by Kens (p. 152) as "Brandeis's novel brief,
which emphasized sociological and scientific data"), upheld a state shorter-hours law. An example on the other side of the coin is Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), in which the
Court struck down a statute prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts (contracts which prohibited an
employee from joining a union).
33. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See supra note 3.
34. 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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useful. Kens gives a purely descriptive account of substantive due process, making no new arguments about the doctrine. Furthermore, the
book fails to provide a complete, accurate description of the growth
and development of substantive due process between the enactment of
the fourteenth amendment and the Lochner decision, a task which has
been fulfi11ed by other authors. 38
-

Charles A. Bieneman

38. See, e.g., F. STRONG, supra note 14; L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 562-74.

